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Miryam Colacrai* 
 
Steps Towards Integration in Latin America 
The Role of Ideas, Institutions and Policies in the  
MERCOSUR** 
 
Starting point considerations 
It is known that the unstable rise and fall of the MERCOSUR’s goals has lately been placing 
its future viability at the centre of the debate. Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that those 
who stress its weaknesses and difficulties often fail to make a broad and comprehensive 
reading of the variables at stake. They tend to emphasize explanations of issues denoting 
asymmetries, which often are not solved properly within a framework of interdependence 
generated precisely in a process of integration. Differences, difficult or non conducive 
negotiations, or circumstantial issues which are pessimistically considered as objective 
conditions and often used to discourage its continuation, generally mar other fulfillments. 
Broadly speaking, a large number of those analyses or comments on the current situation of the 
MERCOSUR and its prospects show an almost exclusively commercialist bias, and do not 
tackle the full scope of the phenomenon to which we refer.  
Regarding this subject, I agree with the concept that “integration processes involve complex 
society movements whose keys cannot be covered within a temporary and merely 
commercialist interpretation”. Their diversity and scope makes them solely achievable by means 
of an interdisciplinary and long term approach. And probably one of the major deficits of the 
MERCOSUR, which is felt during the most critical moments, is the absence of a ‘way of thinking 
about it’” (Hirst et al., 2001). 
If we consider the possibility of relaunching or re founding the MERCOSUR, this is an 
appropriate moment to work in the field of “ideas”. In order to make progress on this proposal, it 
is advisable not to be caught by “pessimistic” interpretations, nor by a naïve view. Therefore, it 
is worth making, at least in general terms, an evaluation of what the existence of the 
MERCOSUR has provided. 
In 2001 the former Secretary of Commerce and International Economic Relations of 
Argentina, Martín Redrado, emphasized that there had been a fair amount of opinions advising, 
on several occasions, to retrace the steps and go back to a free trade area, or simply to defuse 
the integration process. When confronted with the dilemma of “advancing or retreating” in the 
process of integration, it is better to consider or to evaluate the issue under a structural 
perspective, avoiding the current ups and downs that may distort the analysis. First, we must 
not lose sight of the fact that in every process of integration it is common to witness periods of 
apparent stagnation. The European experience, which took eleven years to make up an 
imperfect customs association (while the MERCOSUR took four), thirty–six years to create a 
Common Market, and forty-two years to have a single currency (the Euro), and that between 
1973 and 1985 stood a prolonged lethargy of “europessimism”, is eloquent proof in this respect 
(Redrado, 2001: 200-201). 
Therefore, if we analyze it in a comprehensive way, the MERCOSUR has meant the creation 
of a singular cooperation order, unprecedented up to this moment in South America, combined 
with a wide range of relevant issues. Among them, democratic consolidation (democracy being 
a condition to participate in the integration process) and the creation of a zone of peace are to 
be noticed
1
, overcoming the conflict hypotheses which had largely guided the behaviors and 
relations among many of its members. Besides, it encouraged an increase of border bonds, so 
that these areas were then perceived as places of cooperation, contact and rapprochement 
instead of political and economic barriers. It generated a common economic space and 
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provided a significant level of political understanding between the member states engaging the 
national societies as well. Regarded as a unit, all of its members were made more visible than if 
they were individually considered. 
Thus, taking into account those strengths and recognizing that the weaknesses of the 
MERCOSUR would reside in the ideational factor, it would be better to refer to the 
contributions of the International Relations “constructivist approaches”. They offer 
greater possibilities for creating bridges with other social disciplines, justifying 
explanations that are more complex. 
We will first refer to the advantages of adopting a constructivist perspective aiming at the re-
launching of the MERCOSUR. Then, we will devote ourselves to the analysis of several “axes 
ideas” around which it would be possible to develop that launching. Some of them have to do 
with a redefinition of the autonomy that will necessarily include the regional dimension, together 
with the necessity of measuring the institutional deficit of the MERCOSUR, which would need 
correction, as well as recognizing the necessity of emphasizing its non-economic agenda.  
 
The importance of adopting a constructivist analytical framework 
Neo-realism in general, and the “theory of games”, have shown little skill in explaining the 
various factors of weight in adopting decisions within the field of International Relations and 
Foreign Policy. The diversity of analyses related to the MERCOSUR has not been exempt from 
that shortsightedness. The analyses have been characterized almost exclusively by the 
incorporation of rationalist notions such as those related to power measuring and cost-benefit 
calculation, and at the same time, they have avoided the inclusion of cognitive elements. 
Even the functionalist approaches, which supported various explanations about the creation 
of regional spaces and processes of integration, assigning a central place to the “spillover” 
effect
2
, started from some assumptions. They related them almost mechanically, choosing a 
systemic dynamics and forgetting how processes are “built”. 
Lately, the recognition of failures hindering the understanding of many international relations 
processes has led a part of the academic world to focus on the rediscovery of the importance 
that ideas and beliefs have in the design and support of policies. Obviously, there still is a great 
deal of studies and investigations that do not attach any importance to these factors. The 
renewal attempt that is beginning to be observed has to do with the changes and complexities 
that our postmodern world experiences today. This world moves away from exclusively positivist 
calculations and needs to be tackled with a greater mental openness. It also suggests the 
necessity of imagining and giving sense to the creation of possible scenarios and not being 
trapped in analyses of what is bound to happen, as if it was impossible to generate changes 
and progress.  
Institutions, ideas, experts’ participation or “epistemic communities”
3
, and the impact that 
legitimate political decision-makers can exercise, seem to form the necessary “virtuous circle” in 
order to meet a correspondence between the field of ideas and that of politics.  
Thus, a good orientation is offered by a wide range of new visions, especially from the 
constructivist school
4
, so that this can be turned into a fruitful field for the understanding of the 
various international events.  
Those who want to hold on strictly to the “realist dogma” will say that a causal 
connection cannot be found between ideas and political consequences. We could reply 
by saying that neither is there a causal relation when explanations are based exclusively 
in factors such as military power and economic power. Obviously, nobody could doubt 
the incidence and weight of these, particularly if they go hand in hand, for example, in 
hegemony situations. But it is also true that in international politics there still is a large 
spectrum of possibilities to explain results that do not respond only to them. In that 
direction, a very rich field is opened up in order to investigate the impact these ideas –
especially their strength and legitimacy– may have as shapers of behaviors and 
policies
5
. 
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Taking into account that the MERCOSUR has taken the process of European 
integration as a maximum reference, I will refer in the first place to certain contributions 
that have brought about evidence of the weight of “ideas”, both at the foundation stage 
of the European Economic Community and in the subsequent process that led to the 
formation of the current European Union. 
Those who develop this view find the root of the community process, precisely, in the 
combination of perceptions and ideas about how the world works, about the validity of certain 
principles and values, and about the ways in which they believe it is possible to lay the new 
grounds for coordination and cooperation. 
When that hard core offered by the first ideas is shared, it is later on strengthened with the 
creation of institutions. Ideas continue their development within its frame, following feedback 
dynamics. It is convenient to note here that such a process is not presented in an automatic 
way or out of habit. On the contrary, it needs to be strengthened through the legitimacy that the 
institutions themselves and the political decision-makers acquire in accordance with the 
effective development of policies
6
. As Noto (2001: 17-18) has suggested, “the relation between 
institutional development and progress in integration has occupied an important place in the 
regional processes. In the progressive evolution of the European process, a complex 
construction and reform of various institutions has taken place. They have fed back the 
integrationist tendencies”. Therefore, we could say that the key to success lies there. 
In order to refer to what has taken place in Europe, though superficially, and pointing some 
examples out, it would be worth to remember how the “ideational” element weighed in the 
emergence of its first common policy, the so-called CAP (Common Agriculture Policy), as well 
as the commitment to free competition principles, which led to a subsequent legal order and to 
the formation of institutions inside the EC that observed its fulfillment and punished its 
violations. In the same line, and among other achievements, we find the renewed 
Environmental Policies. On the other hand, the lack of a common Security Policy could be the 
result –among other factors– of a deficit as regards ideas. Nowadays, it appears that Europeans 
are thinking seriously about a “European Security and Defense Identity” in order to move away 
from their traditional American dependence. 
After a rapid revision of the European example, let us remember that in the case of Latin 
America the decades from the 50s to the 70s formed a stage rich in ideas (some of them 
generated within the ECLAC itself), from which various autonomization proposals emerged, 
exceeding the supposed “irreversible rule” which predicted that the small and medium states 
are the “object” and not “subjects” of international politics, and subjected to a “permanent 
peripheralism”. They have prepared the ground to think in terms of independent foreign policies, 
handling “margins of manoeuvre”, with the aim of acting abroad and achieving better positions 
as regards integration in the world.  
The possibility of generating a new debate about autonomy, which is precisely one of the 
“axes ideas” we propose in this paper, requires to carry out an analysis of this central concept 
and its evolution. 
 
A new concept of autonomy? Revisiting the old one and constructing a 
“new idea” 
During the seventies and the beginning of the eighties, a sort of doctrinaire school on Latin 
American autonomy was formed. It was led mainly by the academic works of Helio Jaguaribe in 
Brazil, and of Juan Carlos Puig in Argentina, who had a lot of disciples and followers
7
. Within 
the historical context of the bipolar order (where the concept is set and takes on significance), in 
this foundational stage of the autonomist school in Latin America, the strongest bet of autonomy 
was mainly placed on the possibility of confrontation. Another characteristic to emphasize in that 
definition of autonomy is the presence of the idea of “aggregation of strengths” offered by the 
linkage and the coordination of positions with the “equals”. It was thought from the perspective 
of each of the states individually, and within it the regional dimension “added capacities”, so that 
such national interests would be better preserved. 
Unfortunately, during the 90s, the theoretical production that assigned some importance to 
autonomy was limited or almost nil. For many people, it was almost an “antique” or a 
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“consumption” of capacities, which would rather serve a pragmatic insertion in the world. That 
excess of pragmatism was not conducive at all, as shown by the reality of our countries, since 
perhaps it put creativity to sleep and fostered the adoption of a pattern of behaviour that 
progressively estranged itself from its own definitions in accordance of the region’s interests
8
. 
A generic definition, within the field of International Relations, regards it as “an 
objective of policies which might be achieved in a gradual and increasing measure 
becoming mixed, in variable doses, with situations of dependence, interdependence and 
external conditioning” (Tomassini, 1989: 302). 
The validity assigned to “autonomy” as a category of analysis and its importance for the 
region is beginning to generate new thoughts, though still in a manner too incipient to constitute 
a “theoretical body”. 
This new theoretical discussion took place with the advent of the year 2000, when certain 
Latin American governments once more recognize the importance of coordinating their policies 
and the adoption of common positions. It is necessary, therefore, for autonomy to be imbued 
with a new explanatory capacity.  
An attempt to “re-conceptualize it”, recovering it but in a non-confrontational sense, started to 
be outlined in some presentations made by Russell and Tokatlian
9
. They consider it necessary 
to re-signify the concept of “autonomy” as a “condition”; that is, the ability to take decisions in an 
independent way, without following other states’ wishes, preferences or orders. They 
understand that its previous narrowness and national exclusiveness has now been modified. 
Conversely, it is boosted by democratization, cooperation and policy coordination processes 
developing in our region. That is why they would rather refer to “relational autonomy”, which 
would constitute the capacity and disposition of states to take independent decisions together 
with other partners, in order to manage processes produced within and beyond their frontiers. In 
their analysis, they start from an allegedly strong point: that an increase in the autonomy level of 
our countries cannot today be the result of domestic or sub-regional policies of isolation, self-
sufficiency or opposition. 
The possibility of thinking of this kind of “relational autonomy” for Latin America must not be 
evaluated –as was considered in the 70s– according to the capacity to confront or oppose the 
United States, because it does not rule out agreements with the hegemonic power. It entails 
coordinated work, negotiation in international systems and in the regional dimension, the first 
circle for its practice being the South American region itself. Autonomy involving the political, 
economic and military areas is procured by means of internationalization and regionalization 
strategies rather than nationalization ones, and at this historical moment, it is clearly facilitated 
by the democratization of the region and the experimentation of regional integration processes. 
In a similar way, there are also other academic works that promote the development of a 
“concerted autonomy”
10
 as well as the attainment of a “new personality and autonomy” since 
cooperation and regional integration were deepened
11
. 
It is also possible to pick up concepts aiming in the same direction in a variety of forums and 
political speeches. In this respect, if one reviews the conceptual and programmatic content 
expressed in the “Brasilia Communiqué”
12
, it is possible to find at least two axes that help in the 
construction of a new autonomy design, which it might be advantageous to think about for the 
region. First, a commitment to integration as a foreign policy objective, incorporated into the 
national identity of the countries of the area. Second, the possibility of facing the globalization 
challenges, deepening integration, and acting in a coordinated way and with solidarity in relation 
to the treatment of the great issues on the international economic and social agenda. 
Sharing the same spirit, there is a reassertion of the integration objectives at the 
MERCOSUR Summit in Buenos Aires in July 2002, at the South American Summit of Guayaquil 
of July 27th of the same year, and in the document signed in 2003 by presidents Lula da Silva 
(Brazil) and Néstor Kirchner (Argentina), which came to be known as the “Buenos Aires 
Consensus”. 
The so-called “autonomy for integration” has also appeared within official discourses, which 
according to the description of then Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lampreia
13
 responded 
to the new foreign policy design of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the president at that time. It 
was observed that the old conception of “autonomy” emphasized self-sufficiency and the 
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adoption of confrontational stances. On the contrary, an updated reformulation should not be 
isolationist, but a way of being articulated with the international environment. His words are 
eloquent in this sense: “The times of isolation and of self-sufficiency are over. National 
sovereignty has ceased to be an argument for behaviors that go against fundamental values”. 
“Autonomy for integration means support for international regimes”.  
Let us bear in mind that declarations, speeches at summits, are statements of very 
important principles indeed, which are necessary though not sufficient. Still, they set up 
guidelines aiming at “constructing a body of theory”. It is essential to be aware of this 
necessity, putting special emphasis on the responsibility-privilege that the so-called 
“epistemic communities” (of knowledge or academe) should have, in this case in 
relation to the working out of ideas. 
The building of a new definition of autonomy requires that the regional dimension be 
incorporated as a part of its own essence, its way of thinking about it, and not as a mere 
“aggregation”. In that sense, we understand that the regional dimension appears as a 
constitutive part of the new nature acquired by autonomy and not as a factor of “summing up 
capacities”. 
 
The advantages of a greater institutionalization 
 
Men are necessary for changes, institutions to make changes live […] There are no 
premature ideas, there are timely moments one should know how to wait for [...] 
Men do not accept changes except out of necessity: they do not see necessity except 
in a crisis 
Monnet
14
 
 
The brilliance of Monnet’s ideas is an appropriate prologue to draw attention to the 
institutional deficit that the MERCOSUR exhibits and of which we have frequently not been 
aware. From different angles, though predominantly from the economic and commercial 
standpoint, and mainly from the Argentine view, there has been an insistence on the necessity 
of an institutional adjustment, either because of the creation of new structures or the 
strengthening of existing ones. 
As indicated by Redrado (2001: 231), on various occasions the necessity of eliminating 
“legal gaps” that are often fertile soil for controversies has been raised. The measures could be 
aimed at reforming the decision-making process, finding new formulas for the adoption of 
majorities instead of unanimity, establishing deadlines for the internalization of norms, or 
channeling controversies into the mechanisms foreseen for their resolution.  
This includes a comprehensive revision of the institutional framework, sacrificing flexibility in 
order to gain legal security, which is vital for the partner-states, for individuals, and for the 
different environments of international negotiation. In Nofal’s opinion
15
, the modus operandi of 
the negotiation should be changed, assuring a greater participation of the government 
authorities having political decision power in negotiations of a technical nature, and promoting a 
greater institutionalization of justice administration that will allow the MERCOSUR to exhibit 
greater predictability and legal security, which will strengthen the investment attraction of the 
region. According to her suggestions, the setting up of a permanent Court of Justice, 
independent from governments, should be evaluated
16
. 
Considering a perspective that mainly centers on the topic of institutionalization from the 
legal and political aspect, it can be held that the MERCOSUR, according to the profile adopted 
until this moment, constitutes an intergovernmental entity. It is endowed with legal capacity but 
lacks supranational instances, it does not provide for any legal control of the acts announced by 
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the different organs, and it does not have in an explicit way a parliamentary control at the 
decision-making level. For Operti Badán
17
, this configuration indicates that the internalization of 
the MERCOSUR’s regulations within member states legal order is made by holding it down to 
the procedures of the respective national law, clearly showing the absence of supranationality. 
These speculations about what the MERCOSUR should have or would have to be given 
maintain a close relationship with the way in which it will be conceived and projected in the 
future. 
Before deciding what to do at the institutional level, its joint strategic conception should be 
defined. According to this, if it is agreed that maintaining it as an “economic cooperation” 
process is enough (though it is very difficult for the economic sphere to be affected or entwined 
with other issues which are to be harmonized), the improvement of its administrative instances 
(circulation, information, technical assistance and connections with the internal administrative 
structure) and its application in the member states should be worked on. Further, if it is 
considered that the MERCOSUR must be deepened as an economic and political process, its 
organic structure will have to undergo a qualitative and deep reform in order to endow it with 
another sort of institutionalization
18
. 
Starting from a revision of the positions held by the member countries relating to the subject 
of a greater institutionalization, some significant characteristics can be inferred. Although these 
views should not be taken as “official”, but rather as the combination of statements in forums –
on the part of politicians as well as staff– and in academic circles, there appears to exist a direct 
link between a greater political and economic weight, and a greater distance regarding the 
deepening of the MERCOSUR and the supranational commitments that each country is ready 
to assume. The request for instances “of a rather communitarian sort” has been frequent on the 
part of Uruguay and Paraguay. They understood that these would safeguard them from the 
dangers of unilateral policies that bigger members can adopt, and besides allow a better 
handling of interdependence within the bloc, and of their “member” status. In relation to 
Argentina, the general tendency has been directed at a greater institutionalization (perhaps 
excessively motivated by a “commercialist” reading of the process). For Brazil, in the opinion of 
Bernal Meza (2001: 65), “the problem does not lie in institutions but in what is cultural, since on 
the part of governments, businessmen and the elite there has been no transcendence of the 
MERCOSUR towards society as a whole”
19
. 
Underlying this are the regulatory capabilities given to norms and institutions by the more 
economicist approaches, as well as by those that stress the weight of legal and political 
variables. Our purpose in this paper is to explore the possibility of revising the institutions in a 
“constitutive” dimension, understanding, in accordance with the constructivist vision, that 
institutions have a lot to say regarding the change or transformation of identities and interests, 
for the actors within them are gradually shaping practices and interactions that are added to the 
changes in perceptions and ways of action. 
It is important to re-emphasize the intrinsic value of institutions. Besides their contribution to 
giving order to the “governance” of the process, they favour the socialization of ideas and of a 
social learning process that would later have effects on policies. 
What has been said up to this moment, at least at the level of hypothesis, would indicate that 
there might be a “virtuous circle” formed by ideas + institutions + political decision-makers = 
policies, occurring together in a process of continuous feedback. 
In the same direction, it is necessary to reinforce the “non economic agenda” of the 
MERCOSUR within the framework of its own logic. What do we mean by this? If we go through 
other subjects of negotiation, such us migrational and environmental issues or education topics, 
it is possible to notice the strong commercial direction that breaks through all of them. Focused 
on the necessity of ensuring a space of “free circulation of goods and services” for the future, 
the underlying logic is perhaps excessively utilitarian and based on economic factors. 
 
Some final thoughts 
In order for the MERCOSUR to be able to emerge and consolidate, its “ideational” 
strengthening is a necessary task. In this direction, it will be necessary for the “epistemic 
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community”, in this case the intelligentsia devoted to socio-political issues, to recover its 
capacity in order to establish and legitimate expanded definitions of autonomy.  
It is necessary to reintroduce the debate on autonomy, especially taking into account that 
when considering some concepts such as “concerted autonomy”, “that which pertains to 
relations” and “that which pertains to participation”, there is a certain coincidence in giving 
centrality to the regional issue. 
If a constructivist approach were adopted, it would aim for the construction of a new self-
perception and a way of having an identity in relation to other regional spaces, for the 
management of common issues and for the insertion of the region in the interaction of 
“interdependence”. Additionally, a consensus around the definition of the MERCOSUR as a 
strategic alliance should be reached, having an identity and the capacity to “cope with” 
international interdependence. In order to take action in an increasingly complex and less 
permissive international scenario for individual actions, it is necessary that policies be 
coordinated and agreed on from within the region.  
This implies revitalizing the MERCOSUR based on what exists, but above all, creating, 
“constructing” institutions so that they prop up its launching and facilitate its subsequent 
strengthening
20
.  
Institutions can in turn help to strengthen regional integration, reducing the possibilities that 
its actual “vulnerability” should be profited by other actors. If we recognize the “constitutive” 
rather than the “regulatory” value possessed by institutions, we will be on the road to fulfill the 
virtuous circle we have defined as ideas + institutions + political decision-makers = policies, 
acting together in a process of continuous feedback. 
In the countries of the region, we are going through times of “change”, which adds to the 
perception of a deep crisis. It is precisely in relation to that diagnosis that I want to remember, 
once again, Monnet’s brilliant words when he said, “men do not accept changes except out of 
necessity. They do not see necessity except in a crisis”.  
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Notes 
 
* Professor of Theory of International Relations, School of Political Science and International Relations, National 
University of Rosario. Director of Projects, CERIR, Rosario, Argentina. 
** The MERCOSUR (Common Market of the South) comprises Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. It was 
created with the adoption of the Treaty of Asunción signed on March 26, 1991. In 1996, Chile and Bolivia became 
members as “associated states”. 
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1 The democratic clause and the establishment of a Zone of Peace are within the Ushuaia Protocol (July 24th, 
1998). Moreover, the latter reiterates what the Presidential Declaration of Las Leñas of June 27, 1992, expresses, in 
the sense that the full validity of democratic institutions is an indispensable condition for the MERCOSUR’s 
existence and development. 
2 A functional “spillover” from some areas to others was hoped for. Even though the first spillover would be seen 
among related technical and economic areas, it would expand later towards other fields such as those of politics 
and culture (see, for example Haas, Ernst 1961 “International Integration: The European and the Universal Process” 
in International Organization, XV, Autumn). In a similar sense, expressions such as “branching” appeared (see 
Mitrany, David 1966 A Working Peace System, Chicago: Quadrangle Books). 
3 In this respect, see the liminal works of Haas, Peter 1990 Saving the Mediterranean. The Politics of International 
Environmental Cooperation (New York: Columbia University Press) and 1992 “Introduction: Epistemic Communities 
and International Policy Coordination” in International Organization, Vol. 46/1: 1-35. 
4 Since the incorporation of socio-cognitive factors that help to understand processes, there is an attempt, as from 
“constructivism”, to overcome certain shortages shown by the neorealist and neo-liberal approaches. In addition, 
differences between rationalists and reflectivists seem to shorten within its bosom. In this respect, it can be pointed 
out that some contributions emphasize the production of international norms and the necessity of understanding not 
only the regulatory value of such norms, but their “constitutive” aspect (see Onuf, Nicholas 1989 World of Our 
Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations, Columbia University of South Carolina Press). 
This is what matters for constructivists. It tries to indicate that norms form an inter-subjective consensus among 
actors, which in turn constitutes or reconstitutes their identities and interests. In Wendt’s opinion, in addition to the 
liberal arguments regarding their contribution to developing cooperative behaviors in spite of global anarchy, 
institutions and regimes have a major participation in the change or transformation of identities and interests. There 
are relations among actors that are gradually shaping practices and interactions that are added to the changes 
gradually produced in perceptions and ways of action. What they do and what they are should be explored. Being a 
member of an organization gradually shapes actors and their interests, and this also modifies their behaviors (see 
Wendt, Alexander 1992 “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of World Politics” in International 
Organization, Vol. 46/2: 391-425; 1995 “Constructing International Politics” in International Security, Vol. 20/1: 71-
81. For other contributions, see Checkel, Jeffrey 1999 “International Institution and Socialization”. Paper presented 
at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, (Washington DC) February. 
5 The debate presented by Yee, Albert S. 1996 “The causal effects of ideas on policies” in International 
Organization, Vol.50/1: 68-108, is very interesting. 
6 In this respect, see Parsons, Craig 2002) “Showing Ideas as Causes: The origins of the European Union” in 
International Organization, Vol. 56/1: 47-84. 
7 Let us mention the following papers: Puig, Juan Carlos 1980 International Doctrines and Latin American 
Autonomy (Caracas: Instituto de Altos Estudios de América Latina of the Simón Bolivar University); Jaguaribe, Helio 
et al. 1969 Dependence and Autonomy in Latin America (Mexico: Siglo XXI); Jaguaribe, Helio 1982 “Central 
Hegemony and Peripheral Autonomy” in Hill ,Eduardo and Tomassini, Luciano Latin America and the New 
International Economic Order (Buenos Aires: Belgrano). In relation with some issues linked to the design of Foreign 
Politics, I have dealt with the paper entitled “Foreign Policy, Regionalization and Autonomy: Revisiting Analysis 
Categories” presented at the International Seminar on Political Science (AUGM-UFRGS), Porto Alegre, October 3-
5, 2001. 
8 Gerhard Drekonja produced a significant reformulation and redefinition of his own ideas about “autonomy” with 
which his works on Foreign Policy of the end of the 70s and most of the 80s were identified –especially those 
referring to Colombia. He moves on to a definition and pragmatic interpretation of the foreign action courses that 
Latin American states may follow. Their international integration must be along the same side and in the same line 
as American policies. He emphasizes the depreciation suffered by autonomizing strategies, the loss of logic in the 
diversification of the bonds referring to “diagonal relations with Europe”, and the impossibility of gaining access to 
the “middle class of the Third World nations” which had been the Latin American dream of the 70s and 80s. By 
virtue of this and of the redesign the world has experienced in the post-cold war era, he understands that “the 
discussion on peripheral autonomy belongs to the past” and that the future of Latin America cannot be conceived 
except alongside the United States (Drekonja, Gerhard 1993 “Peripheral Autonomy Redefined. Latin America in the 
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Decade of the Nineties” in Gómez, Drekonja, Tokatlian and Carvajal Redefining Autonomy in Internacional Politics 
(Centro de Estudios Internacionales of the Universidad de los Andes) Serie Documentos Ocasionales, Nº 31, July-
September: 18-21. The Argentine case during the Menem administration can be exhibited as a paradigmatic 
example of uncritical alignment as regards the United States, framed by the dogmatic adoption of the “Washington 
Consensus” and a reading of “peripheral realism” that, applied to a country not strategically significant for the 
hegemonic power, who decided to “tie up” its policies to the hegemon with the perspective of some “future 
advantages” although not being able to provide the probable profits beforehand. See Escudé, Carlos 1992 
Peripheral Realism. Grounds for the New Argentine Foreign Policy (Buenos Aires: Editorial Planeta), and Escudé, 
Carlos 1991 “Menem’s Foreign Policy and its Implicit Theoretical Support” in Latin America/International Letter, Vol. 
8, Nº 27, January-March (some theoretical tendencies describe these kinds of visions as “utilitarian perspectives”).  
9 Preliminarily, these ideas were presented at the Workshop “The state of the Contemporary Debate in International 
Relations”, Buenos Aires, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, July 27-28, 2000. Later, they were published in Russell, 
Roberto and Tokatlian, Juan G. “From Antagonistic Autonomy to Relational Autonomy: A Theoretical Look from the 
Southern Cone” in Postdata (Buenos Aires) Nº 7. 
10 The proposal corresponds to work done by Venezuelan and Colombian academicians who introduce the idea of 
jointly processing agreement strategies, though not those on confrontation, even for treating issues related to the 
United States. See Bi-national Academic Group 1999 “Colombia-Venezuela. Analysis of the XXI Century Agenda”  
in Political Analysis (Bogota). 
11 Vacchino, Juan M. 2001 “The South American Summit and the Development of an Utopia” in SELA Chapters 
(Caracas) Nº 61: 50. He makes special mention of cooperation, not only in the commercial field but also in areas 
such as the development of reciprocal investments, infrastructure and scientific and technological capability.  
12 It includes the results of the First Meeting of Presidents of South America, called by Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso, then president of Brazil, and held in Brasilia between August 31 and September 1 2000. The following 
were present: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. 
13 See Lampreia, Luiz Felipe 1998 “A Politica externa do Governo FHC: continuidade e renovação” in Revista 
brasileira de Politica Internacional (Brasilia) Nº 2: 11. With reference to the same idea, Ambassador Gelson 
Fonseca Junior differentiates “autonomy because of distance” from “autonomy because of participation” in Dupas, 
Gilberto and Vigevani, Tullo (comp.) 2000 O Brasil e as novas dimensões da seguranca internacional (São Paulo: 
Alfa-Omega) 17-42. 
14 These and other ideas can be found in Jean Monnet’s thoughts in 1996 Repères pour une méthode (Paris: 
Fayard). 
15 In this respect, see Nofal, María Beatriz 1997 “Great Unresolved Matters in MERCOSUR” in Boletín Informativo 
Techint Nº 292, October-December, p. 78-79, and Nofal, María Beatriz 1998 “Institutional and Economic Obstacles 
for the Consolidation and Deepening of the MERCOSUR: Proposals” in Boletín Informativo Techint Nº 294, April-
June, p. 48. 
16 While this paper was being presented (August 2004), it was announced the settlement of the MERCOSUR Court 
as an arbitration body. 
17 Parts of these thoughts are within “Perspectives on the Institutionalization of the MERCOSUR”, working paper 
presented at the MERCOSUR: Forum of the Future meeting, CARI, Buenos Aires, August 30, 1996. Also, Carlos 
Moneta explains the “institutional weakness” of the MERCOSUR, comparing it with other processes of regional 
integration. The most asymmetric comparison is the one referring to the European Union (see Chart 1, “Profile of 
Several Diagrams of Integration in the World. Indicators” in Moneta, Carlos 2002 “Integration, Politics and Markets 
in the Global Era: MERCOSUR and the ALCA” in Couffignal, Georges and Jozami, Aníbal (coords.) Latin America. 
The Beginning of the New Millennium (Buenos Aires: UNTREF) p. 105. 
18 Some key concepts related to different institutionalization scenarios have been a subject of discussion at the 
Workshop “Institutional Challenges Facing the Current Situation of the MERCOSUR” sponsored by CARI, Buenos 
Aires, April 15, 1999. 
19 Bernal Meza, Raúl 2001 “Institutionalization of the MERCOSUR” in Benecke, Dieter and Loschky, Alexander 
(eds.) MERCOSUR: Political Challenge (Buenos Aires: Konrad Adenauer/CIEDLA) p. 65. 
20 The presidential campaign in Brazil, in 2002, allowed the visualization of explicit references related to the 
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MERCOSUR. “The MERCOSUR is treated as if it were a protocol of intentions and not a regional body”, states 
Anthony Garotinho 2002 “O Brasil e a questao externa” in International Letter, Year X, Nº 114, August, p. 8. In turn, 
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in “Presença soberana no Mundo”, refers to “a reconstructed MERCOSUR” that “must 
demand progress in the field of the institutions that are going to preside over the integration policy”, in International 
Letter, p. 9. A similar reference to the necessity of “institutionalization” was expressed by this candidate in the 
interview conducted by Marcelo Bonelli for the program “A Dos Voces”, broadcast by TN, Argentina, on September 
23, 2002. These proposals are expanded when he expresses himself in favor of “a Parliament of the MERCOSUR” 
democratically elected by direct vote, which would legitimate the decisions taken at the presidents’ level. In this 
respect, see Gossman, Eleonora 2002 “A Destiny Staked in portuñol” in Clarín (Buenos Aires) September 29, p. 3. 
These policy guidelines also appear in “Interviews”, Foreign Politics, Vol. II Nº 2, Sept.-Oct.-Nov. 2002: 7, when the 
candidate Lula insists on the establishment of common public policies and an institutional framework that will allow 
status and societies to be represented, as steps that will strengthen the MERCOSUR. On January 13, 2003, when 
the meeting held between the new Brazilian president Lula da Silva and the then Argentine president Eduardo 
Duhalde took place, the ideas previously mentioned won support. For his part, in Argentina, during the television 
program “De ahora en más” broadcasted on May 23, 2003 and conducted by Van der Koy and Bertone, president-
elect Néstor Kirchner, some days before assuming the post, expressed his commitment not only towards the 
widening of the MERCOSUR, but also to contributing to endow it with institutions, assigning it a political profile. In 
his presidential message before Congress, on May 25, he stressed the priority the MERCOSUR would have for his 
government. 
